ISBN-13: 9781612194851
Einband: Taschenbuch
Seiten: 576
Gewicht: 521 g
Format: 203x134x43 mm
Sprache: Englisch

The Senate Intelligence Committee Report on Torture

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From the contents
Foreword by Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Dianne Feinstein

Findings and Conclusions

Executive Summary

I. Background on the Committee Study

II. Overall History and Operation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program

A. September 17, 2001, Memorandum of Notification (MON) Authorizes the CIA to Capture and Detain a Specific Category of Individuals

B. The Detention of Abu Zubaydah and the Development and Authorization of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

C. Interrogation in Country - and the January 2003 Guidelines

D. The Detention and Interrogation of 'Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri

E. Tensions with Country - Relating to the CIA Detention Facility and the Arrival of New Detainees

F. The Detention and Interrogation of Ramzi Bin Al-Shibh

G. The Detention and Interrogation of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad

H. The Growth of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program

I. Other Medical, Psychological, and Behavioral Issues

J. The CIA Seeks Reaffirmation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program in 2003

K. Additional Oversight and Outside Pressure in 2004: ICRC, Inspector General, Congress, and the U.S. Supreme Court

L. The Pace of CIA Operations Slows; Chief of Base Concerned About "Inexperienced, Marginal, Underperforming" CIA Personnel; Inspector General Describes Lack of Debriefers as "Ongoing Problem"M. Legal and Operational Challenges in 2005

N. The Final Disposition of CIA Detainees and the End of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program

III. Intelligence Acquired and CIA Representations on the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques to Multiple Constituencies

A. Background on CIA Effectiveness Representations

B. Past Efforts to Review the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

C. The Origins of CIA Representations Regarding the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques as Having "Saved Lives,""Thwarted Plots," and "Captured Terrorists"D. CIA Representations About the Effectiveness of Its Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Against Specific CIA Detainees

E. CIA Effectiveness Claims Regarding a "High Volume of Critical Intelligence"

F. The Eight Primary CIA Effectiveness Representations - The Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques "Enabled the CIA to Disrupt Terrorist Plots" and "Capture Additional Terrorists"

G. CIA Secondary Effectiveness Representations - Less Frequently Cited Disrupted Plots, Captures, and Intelligence that the CIA Has Provided as Evidence for the Effectiveness of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques

IV. Overview of CIA Representations to the Media While the Program Was Classified

A. The CIA Provides Information on the Still-Classified Detention and Interrogation Program to Journalists Who Then Publish Classified Information; CIA Does Not File Crimes Reports in Connection with the Stories

B. Senior CIA Officials Discuss Need to "Put Out Our Story" to Shape Public and Congressional Opinion Prior to the Full Committee Being Briefed

C. CIA Attorneys Caution that Classified Information Provided to the Media Should Not Be Attributed to the CIA

D. The CIA Engages with Journalists and Conveys an Inaccurate Account of the Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah

V. Review of CIA Representations to the Department of Justice

A. August 1, 2002, OLC Memorandum Relies on Inaccurate Information Regarding Abu Zubaydah
B. The CIA Interprets the August 1, 2002, Memorandum to Apply to Other Detainees, Despite Language of the Memorandum; Interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and Other Detainees Diverge from the CIA's Representations to the OLC

C. Following Suspension of the Use of the CIA's Enhanced Interrogation Techniques, the CIA Obtains Approval from the OLC for the Interrogation of Three Individual Detainees

D. May 2005 OLC Memoranda Rely on Inaccurate Representations from the CIA Regarding the Interrogation Pr
One of the most significant government reports in American history, this is the complete official summary report of the Senate Intelligence Committee's investigation of the Central Intelligence Agency's interrogation and detention programs launched in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Releasing this report is an important step to restoring our values and showing the world that we are a just society.' - Senate Intelligence Committee chair Senator Diane Feinstein'
On April 3, 2014, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence voted
to send the Findings and Conclusions and the Executive Summary
of its final Study on the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program
to the President for declassification and subsequent public

This action marked the culmination of a monumental effort
that officially began with the Committee's decision to initiate the
Study in March 2009, but which had its roots in an investigation into
the CIA's destruction of videotapes of CIA detainee interrogations
that began in December 2007.

The full Committee Study, which totals more than 6,700 pages,
remains classified but is now an official Senate report. The full report
has been provided to the White House, the CIA, the Department of
Justice, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence in the hopes that
it will prevent future coercive interrogation practices and inform the
management of other covert action programs.

As the Chairman of the Committee since 2009, I write to offer
some additional views, context, and history.

I began my service on the Senate Intelligence Committee in
January 2001. I remember testimony that summer from George Tenet,
the Director of Central Intelligence, that warned of a possible
major terrorist event against the United States, but without specifics
on the time, location, or method of attack. On September 11, 2001, the
world learned the answers to those questions that had consumed the
CIA and other parts of the U.S. Intelligence Community.
For information on the events at the CIA prior to September 11, 2001, see the Final
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11
Commission) and Office of the Inspector General Report on Accountability With Respect
to the 9/11 Attacks.

I recall vividly watching the horror of that day, to include the
television footage of innocent men and women jumping out of the
World Trade Center towers to escape the fire. The images, and
the sounds as their bodies hit the pavement far below, will remain
with me for the rest of my life.

It is against that backdrop - the largest attack against the
American homeland in our history - that the events described in this
report were undertaken.

Nearly thirteen years later, the Executive Summary and Findings
and Conclusions of this report are being released. They are highly
critical of the CIA's actions, and rightfully so. Reading them, it is easy
to forget the context in which the program began - not that the context
should serve as an excuse, but rather as a warning for the future.
It is worth remembering the pervasive fear in late 2001 and how
immediate the threat felt. Just a week after the September 11 attacks,
powdered anthrax was sent to various news organizations and to two
U.S. Senators. The American public was shocked by news of new
terrorist plots and elevations of the color-coded threat level of the
Homeland Security Advisory System. We expected further attacks
against the nation.

I have attempted throughout to remember the impact on the
nation and to the CIA workforce from the attacks of September 11,
2001. I can understand the CIA's impulse to consider the use of every
possible tool to gather intelligence and remove terrorists from the
battlefield, and CIA was encouraged by political leaders and the public
to do whatever it could to prevent another attack.

The Intelligence Committee as well often pushes intelligence
agencies to act quickly in response to threats and world events.
Nevertheless, such pressure, fear, and expectation of further terrorist
plots do not justify, temper, or excuse improper actions taken
by individuals or

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ISBN-13 :: 9781612194851
ISBN: 1612194850
Erscheinungsjahr: 01.02.2015
Verlag: Random House LCC US
Gewicht: 521g
Seiten: 576
Sprache: Englisch
Sonstiges: Taschenbuch, 203x134x43 mm